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RIGHTS AND DIGNITY: CONGRESS, THE 

SUPREME COURT, AND PEOPLE WITH 

DISABILITIES AFTER PENNHURST 

DAVID FERLEGER· 

PATRICE MAGUIRE SCOTT·· 

All great establishments in the nature of boarding schools, 
where the sexes must be separated; where there must be boarding in 
common, and sleeping in congregate dormitories; where there must 
be routine, andformality, and restraint, and repression ofindividual­
ity; where the charms and refining influences ofthe true family rela
tion cannot be had,-.all such institutions are unnatural, undesirable, 
and very liable to abuse. We should have as few ojthem aspossible, 
and thosefew should be kept as small as possible. 
Let me dwell upon this, for in my view, it is very important. 
Such persons spring up sporadically in the community, and the}' 
should be kept dfffused among sound and normal persons. Separa­
tion, and not congregation, should be the law of their treatment;jor 
out oftheir infirmity or abnormality there necessarily grow some ab
normal and undesirable e.ffects, and unless these be counteracted by 
education, they disturb the harmonious development of character. 
These e.ffects are best counteracted by bringing up the child a1f1ong 
ordinary children, and subjecting him to ordinary social andfdmily 
injluences; but, on the contrary, they are intensified by constant-and 
close association with children who are marked by the same infirmity 
or peculiarity. . . . 
... Those establishments are all faulty. Not one of them is 
worthy to be your model in all respects; and the persons who jlaller 
themselves that their favorite one is worthy to be copied exactly, are 
blind to faults which can be seen by looking beneath the suiface. 
Never mind their showy buildings and special accommodations; you 
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may as well measure the mortaliiy ofa family by the structure and 
arrangement of its dwellinghouse, as test instliutions by their 
mechanical advantages; but look at the principles and system by 
which they are conducted You will, then, find they are faulty in 
many respects. 
Instead, then, ofcopying the existing institulion, Ilhink, Ihat in 
organizing a new one something like the following rough plan should 
be adopled'-/f the field were all clear, and no buildings provided, 
there should be buill only a building for school-rooms, recitation 
rooms, music rooms and work shops; and these· should be in or near 
the centre of a dense population. For other purposes, ordinary 
houses would suffice. I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With courage and insight, Dr. Samuel Gridley Howe, founder 
in 1848 of the first public facility in the United States for persons 
with retardation, issued this warning and exhortation to an audience 
gathered for ceremonies· on the laying of a cornerstone at the new 
state institution for the blind in Batavia, New York in 1886. The 
concept of the institution, in principle, was faulty. As Dr. Howe 
realized, respect for the dignity and special needs of people with dis­
abilities requires life in a disability-integrated society. 
Nearly 100 years later, this anti-institutional perspective is ac­
quiring a legal foundation that complements the medical, psycholog­
ical, and sociological research findings that· institutions harm and 
debilitate the people they are intended to serve.2 It is through the 
I. Wolfensberger, The Origin and Nalure of Our Inslilulional Models, in PRESI­
DENT'S COMM. ON MENTAL RETARDATION, CHANGING PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL 
SERVICES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED 59, 138-141 (R. Kugel & W. Wolfensberger, 
eds. 1969) (quoting S.G. HOWE, IN CEREMONIES ON LAYING THE CORNERSTONE OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE INSTITUTION FOR THE BLIND, AT BATAVIA, GENESEE CO., N.Y. 39-43 
(1866) (emphasis in original». 
2. See I. BELKNAP, HUMAN PROBLEMS OF STATE MENTAL HOSPITALS (1956); D. 
BRAGINSKY & B. BRAGINSKY. HANSELS AND GRETELS (1971); R.B. EDGERTON, THE 
CLOAK OF COMPETENCE: STIGMA IN THE LIVES OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED (1967); 
E. GOFFMAN. ASYLUMS (1962); R. KING. N. RAYNES & J. TIZARD, PATTERNS OF RESI­
DENTIAL CARE: SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONS FOR HANDICAPPED CHILDREN 
(1971); P. MORRIS, PUT AWAY (1969); D. VAIL, DEHUMANIZATION AND THE INSTITU­
TIONAL CAREER (1966); Tizard, The Role ofSocial Inslilulions in Ihe Causalion, Preven­
lion, and Allevialion of Menial Relardalion, SOCIAL-CULTURAL ASPECTS OF MENTAL 
RETARDATION 281 (H.C. HAYWOOD ED. 1970); FERLEGER & BOYD,Anli-lnslilulionaliza­
lion: The Promise oflhe Pennhursl Case, 31 STAN. L. REV. 717 (1979); McCormick, Balla 
& Zigler, ResJdenl-Care Praclices in Inslilulions for Relarded Persons. 80 AM. J. MENTAL 
DEFIC. I (1975); Wing. Inslilulionalism in Menial Hospilals. I BRIT. 1. Soc. & CLINICAL 
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recognition of enforceable rights of the disabled that the law has be­
gun to reach into the institutions and to redress the victims' 
grievances.3 
This history in the United States is consistent with international 
elaboration of "bills of rights" for persons with disabilities. One of 
the first major accomplishments of the United Nations-created on 
the heels of the destruction and death of the Holocaust, World War 
II, Hiroshima and Nagasaki-was the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948.4 At the same time, "in countries around the 
globe, parents of handicapped children began to rise up and demand 
from society a better life and greater acceptance for their children."5 
These two international developments were linked: "The key issue of 
the emerging rehabilitation and habilitation movement was a belief 
PSYCH. 38 (1962). One literature review concluded that "most institutional environments 
which have been studied do have adverse effects on the development of subnormal chil­
dren." D. PILLING, THE HANDICAPPED CHILD: RESEARCH REVIEW 80 (1973). For a 
review and discussion of the professional literature see Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalism and 
the Supreme Court, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. (1983) (in press). For recent debate on the 
issues, see Ellis, Common Sense in the Habilitation ofMentally Retarded Persons: A Reply 
fO Menolascino and McGee, 5 MENTAL RETARDATION 221 (1981); Ellis, The Partlow 
Case: A Reply fO Dr. Roos, 5 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 15 (1979); Meno1ascino & McGee, 
Rejoinder to the Partlow Committee, 5 MENTAL RETARDATION 227 (1981); Menolascino 
& McGee. The New Institutions: Last Dlich Arguments, 5 MENTAL RETARDATION 215 
(1981); Roos, Cusfodial Care for the "Subtrainable"-Revisiting an Old Myth, 5 LAW & 
PSYCH. REV. 15 (1979). See also J.A. TALBOTT, THE DEATH OF THE ASYLUM (1978). 
3. See. e.g .. Symposium-Mentally Retarded People and the Law, 31 STAN. L. REV. 
541 (1979); Developments in fhe Law--Civil Commitment ofthe Mentally III, 87 HARV. L. 
REV. 1190 (1974). The Supreme Coun has held that people in mental institutions have a 
constitutional right to safe conditions, freedom of movement and related minimal train­
ing. Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2458-60 (1982); see also O'Conner v. Donald­
son, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 
F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Brewsterv. Dukakis, No. 76-4423-F, slipop. at 8-12 (D. Mass. 
Dec. 7. 1978) (consent decree); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 491-500 (D. Minn. 
1974). affd. 525 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1975), affd in part. 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977). 
consent decree signed sub nom .. Welsch v. Noot, No. 4-72 (D. Minn., Sept. 15, 1980); New 
York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), enforced sub nom., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. 
Carey. 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), enforced 409 F. Supp. 606 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) 
(the Willowbrook case); Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1344 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 
orders entered. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.) (order for mental illness facilities), 344 F. 
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.) (order for mental retardation facilities), affd in part, rev'd and 
remanded in part sub nom. . Wyatt v. Aderholt. 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See gener­
ally ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING AN INSTITUTIONAL ADVOCACY PROGRAM: REP­
RESENTING PEOPLE WITH HANDICAPS (S. Schwartz, R. Fleischner & D. Ferleger eds. 
1981) (materials prepared for Legal Services Corp., Washington, D.C.). 
4. G.A. Res. 217 A (III). U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). reprinted in 2 UNITED 
NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 135 (D. Djonovich ed. 1973). 
5. Dybwad. Socielal Perspecfil'es: Where Do We Go From Here? in COPING WITH 
CRISIS AND HANDICAP 309 (A. Milunsky ed. 1981). 
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in the value and dignity of all human beings, their right to life, to 
liberty and security of person."6 
The United Nations issued its Declaration on the Rights of the 
Child in 1959,7 prescribing that the child who is physically, mentally, 
or socially handicapped must be given the special treatment, educa­
tion, and care required by the individual.s In 1971, the United Na­
tions adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded 
Persons.9 The 1971 Declaration provided that persons with retarda­
tion must enjoy, "to the maximum degree of feasibility, the same 
rights as other human beings."10 Endorsing deinstitutionalization, 
the General Assembly supported integration of persons with 
retardation: 
Whenever possible, the mentally retarded person should live with 
his own family or foster parents [and] participate in different 
forms of community life. The family with which he lives should 
receive assistance. If care in an institution becomes necessary, it 
should be provided in surroundings and other circumstances as 
close as possible to those of normal life. I I 
In 1975, the broader Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons 
was adopted by the United Nations.'2 
"Bill of Rights" is a phrase that has ringing import in our his­
tory. As early as 1689, the phrase was familiar to those who settled 
in America.l3 By 1784, seven states had adopted discrete declara­
tions or bills of rights for incorporation into their constitutions. 14 
The new states were resolved that a Bill of Rights be added to the 
Federal Constitution. As the price for their ratification of the Con­
stitution, the First Congress approved the Bill of Rights on Septem­
ber 26,1789.'5 It is the "numinous aura of the Bill of Rights" 16 that 
6. Id 
7. G.A. Res. 1386, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4249 (1959), 
reprinted in 7 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 195 (D. Djonovich ed. 1974). 
8. Id 
9. G.A. Res. 2856, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) at 93, U.N. Doc. A/8429 
(1971), reprinled in 13 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 449 (D. Djonovich ed. 1976) 
[hereinafter cited as 1971 U.N. Declaration). 
10. Id ~ I. 
11. Id ~ 4. 
12. G.A. Res. 3447, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) at 88, U.N. Doc. Al10034 
(1975). 
13. See The Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. 2 ch. 2 (1688). 
14. 1 J. GOEBEL. HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 101 (1971). 
15. Id at 455; see generally id at 413-56 (historical discussion of the enactment of 
the United States Bill of Rights). 
16. Id at 457. 
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is evoked by the title and provisions of the Developmentally Dis­
abled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 17 the Supreme Court's treat­
ment of which is the subject of this article. 
In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,ls the 
Supreme Court of the United States undermined clear congressional 
intent and the statute's plain language. The Court reduced a power­
ful piece of legislation to a mound of politically self-serving rhetoric. 
The Court has upset the carefully preserved balance among coequal 
branches of our government and, with regard to the rights of persons 
with disabilities, has emerged as the supreme lawmaker of the land. 
A legislative body speaks in many voices but acts in one: the 
legislation that it adopts. The myriad eddies of debate, compromise, 
. committee hearings and findings produce a statute composed of 
words. The words alone do not compel a particular interpretation. 
The Supreme Court has stated: "'In expounding a statute, we must 
not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look 
to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.' "19 
In our discussion below, we present "the whole law, and its ob­
ject and policy" and do so in a chronological and thematic organiza­
tion. We have refrained, until the concluding portions of the article, 
from direct critical analysis of the Supreme Court's judgment, pre­
ferring to allow the reader to make the comparison and draw his or 
her own conclusions. 
II. THE KENNEDY MESSAGE 
We as a Nation have long neglected the mentally ill and the menially 
retarded This neglect must end, ifour Nation is to live up to its own 
standards ofcompassion and dignity and achieve the maximum use 
of its manpower .20 
The promise made to the disabled population of America in ·the 
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act had its 
origins in the combative "attack" on mental disabilities launched in 
the early sixties by the administration of President John F. Ken­
17. 42 U.S.c.A. §§ 6000-6081 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978-81). 
18. 451 U.S. I (1981). 
19. Id at 18-19 (quoting Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (quoting 
United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113. 122 (1849)). 
20. President's Special Message to Congress on Mental Illness and Mental Retar­
dation. 1963 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS. 1466. 1476 (Feb. 5. 1963) [hereinafter cited 
as President's Special Message]. 
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nedy.21 On February 5, 1963, President Kennedy submitted to Con­
gress a special message on the twin problems of mental illness and 
mental retardation in America. Reminding the legislators of the 
government's responsibilities "to assist, stimulate, and channel pub­
lic energies" to resolve such problems, Kennedy accused America of 
a "tradition of neglect" in the area: 
This situation has been tolerated far too long. It has troubled our 
national conscience-but only as a problem unpleasant to men­
tion, easy to postpone, and despairing of solution. The Federal 
Government, despite the nationwide impact of the problem, has 
largely left the solutions up to the States. The States have de­
pended on custodial hospitals and homes. Many such hospitals 
and homes have been shamefully understaffed, overcrowded, un­
pleasant institutions from which death too often provided the only 
firm hope of release.22 
A "bold new approach" was announced.23 Kennedy exhorted 
all levels of government, private foundations, and individual citizens 
to face up to their responsibilities in the area of providing services to 
persons with disabilities by focusing on three national objectives: 
(1) Eradication of the causes of mental illness and retardation by 
increasing research efforts in the fields of science and medicine; 
(2) strengthening manpower resources by training more skilled 
workers and professionals for jobs in mental health; and (3) con­
structing additional and improved community based programs and 
21. The authors wish to note what we deem an inherent weakness in President 
Kennedy's "combative" approach to providing health services for the mentally disabled. 
Although no stranger to the world of disabilities. (his own sister was retarded. had under­
gone a form of neurosurgery and was institutionalized in a private facility. R. KEI'I'EDY. 
TIMES TO REMEMBER 151-52, 285-86 (1974», John Kennedy's understanding of people 
with disabilities was flawed. He shared the same mistaken beliefs that were rampant 
among the public and mental health professionals alike: that the occurrence of retarda­
tion and diverse mental illnesses among a certain percentage of our population is not 
"normal"; that disabilities are freak accidents that can and should be effectively con­
trolled and eventually eliminated by advances in medicine and technology: and that so­
cial and economic forces are not prime causes of disability. Until the so-called "able" 
forces of mankind learn to accept the principle that retardation and other impairments 
are perfectly "normal" and predictable phenomena within contemplation of the law of 
probabilities and our socio-economic system, our attempts to assist the "disabled" in 
effectively coping with our environment shall continue to fail. We must stop attempting 
to fit "disabled" individuals into "normal" molds and accept them for the worthy human 
beings that they are. "Differently-a bled" is a more positive term than "disabled" and we 
commend its use. 
22. President's Special Message, supra note 20. at 1467. 
23. Id. 
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facilities to serve the disabled population.24 
President Kennedy intended his program to supplant existing 
"reliance on the cold mercy of custodial isolation"2S with the "open 
warmth of community concern and capability."26 He specifically at­
tacked the "shabby treatment"27 afforded millions of disabled Amer­
icans and the neglect of millions more in communities throughout 
the nation. The President aimed to reduce, within a decade, the total 
number of people under custodial care by fifty percent or more.28 
This national attack on mental disorders served more than the hu­
manitarian purpose of releasing millions of suffering Americans 
from the bonds of social welfare.29 The attack served practical pur­
poses as well: conservation of public funds and conservation of 
manpower resources.30 
24. Id at 1467-68. 
25. Id at 1468. 
26. Id 
27. Id 
28. Id at 1469. 
29. President Kennedy's expressed objectives were: 
[I) to bestow the full benefits of our society on those who suffer from 
mental disabilities; 
(2) to prevent the occurrence of mental illness and mental retardation 
wherever and whenever possible; 
(3) to provide for early diagnosis and continuous and comprehensive 
care, in the community, of those suffering from these disorders; 
(4) to stimulate improvements in the level of care given the mentally dis­
abled in our State and private institutions, and to reorient those programs to a 
community-centered approach; 
(5) to reduce, over a number of years, and by hundreds of thousands. the 
persons confined to these institutions; 
(6) to retain in and return to the community the mentally ill and mentally 
retarded, and there to restore and revitalize their lives through better health 
programs and strengthened educational and rehabilitation services; and 
(7) to reinforce the will and capacity of our communities to meet these 
problems, in order that communities. in tum, can reinforce the will and capac­
ity of individuals and individual families. 
Id at 1476-77. 
30. President Kennedy calculated the average amount expended per day on the 
nation's eight hundred thousand institutionalized persons at $4 per patient; "too little to 
do much good for the individual but too much if measured in terms of efficient use of our 
mental health dollars." Id at 1467. President Kennedy estimated the total cost to tax­
payers as over $2.4 billion per year in direct public outlays for services. Id Further, he 
claimed that indirect public outlays. such as welfare costs and the waste of human re­
sources. were much higher. Id 
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IlL LEGISLATIVE ROOTS: THE MENTAL RETARDATION 

FACILITIES AND COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH 

CENTERS CONSTRUCTION ACT OF 1963 

President Kennedy's call for decent services to benefit persons 
with disabilities was answered. Congress immediately responded to 
his recommendations in its passage of the Mental Retardation Facil­
ities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 
1963 (CMHCA).31 Couched in terms similar to the President's Spe­
cial Message, the purpose of CMHCA was "to provide assistance in 
combating mental retardation through grants for construction of re­
search centers and grants for facilities for the mentally retarded and 
assistance in improving mental health through grants for construc­
tion and initial staffing of community mental health centers and for 
other purposes ...."32 Similar to the President's national plan, its 
scope was three-tiered. The bill provided for federal assistance in 
the following fields: Title I---<onstruction of research centers and 
facilities for the mentally retarded; title II~stablishment of com­
prehensive community mental health centers (that would provide a 
full range of services including at least diagnostic services, in-patient 
and out-patient care and day and night care); and title III-training 
and teaching of children with retardation, mental illness and other 
handicaps.33 It is title II of CMHCA that eventually spawned the 
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act.34 
Therefore, a closer examination of that title's legislative history is 
warranted. 
Careful scrutiny of House Report No. 694 reveals just how 
closely the 88th Congress intended to embrace President Kennedy's 
proposed attack on mental disabilities. Both the President's address 
and the conference report on CMHCA relied heavily on data devel­
oped through the work of the Joint Commission on Mental Illness 
and Health.35 Persuaded by the inequities and social injustices de­
3\. Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 42 V.S.c.A. §§ 6000­
6081 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978-81». 
32. H.R. REP. No. 694, 88th Cong., lSi Sess. I, reprinted in 1963 V.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 1054, 1054 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 694). 
33. See supra note 3\. 
34. See supra note 17. 
35. Pursuant to the Mental Health Study Act of 1955, ch. 417, 69 Stat. 381, Con­
gress authorized this commission, comprised of thiny-six national organizations of prin­
cipal scientific and professional associations concerned with health, education and 
welfare, to perform a long range study of the nation's health problems. The six year
undenaking provided concepts and plans for effecting badly needed reforms in the treat­
ment of mental illness. H.R. REP. No. 694, supra note 32, at 10-11, reprillled in 1963 V.S. 
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scribed in that Commission's report, Congress concluded: 
The evidence seems clear. Either we must develop the quantity 
and quality of community services which will ultimately replace 
these institutions or we will have to undertake a massive program 
to strengthen the State mental hospitals. The committee [on Inter­
state and Foreign Commerce, to whom S. 1576 was referred] be­
lieves that the development of new methods of treatment, the 
impressive evidence of the possibilities for rehabilitating the men­
tally ill, and a lessening of our disposition to reject and isolate the 
sufferers, all argue strongly for the treatment of mental illness in 
the community.36 
Thus, Congress uttered its first express resolve to mold the current 
trend toward deinstitutionalization into an official national policy 
aimed at the ultimate replacement of these institutions. 
Congress did not take this initial step lightly, nor without hesita­
tion. Rather, it realized its chosen course would require a major ef­
fort on the government's part because: 
[Alt the present time only [one dollar] is being spent on commu­
nity mental health services for every [ten dollars] being spent for 
care in State institutions. Waiting lists at community clinics are 
long and many communities have no programs at all. It is a rare 
community in the Nation where a citizen can, through a single 
point of contact, have access to the full range of diagnostic, thera­
peutic and rehabilitative services, both inpatient and· outpatient, 
for mental illness.37 
Despite its awareness of the obvious expense involved, the 88th Con­
gress willingly, responsibly, and intentionally plotted the nation's 
course toward deinstitutionalization.38 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1063. President Kennedy also appointed a Task Force, con­
sisting of twenty-seven consultants in the field, with the mandate of preparing a national 
plan to combat mental retardation. After a year of intensive study, the panel submitted 
its repon which provided additional statistical information relied on in his message to 
Congress. Id. at 10-13, reprinted in 1963 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1063-65. 
36. Id. at 12, reprinted in 1963 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1065. 
37. Id. 
38. It is imponant to note at this juncture that even in the seminal stages of devel­
oping comprehensive health services for the mentally disabled, Congress was careful to 
avoid running head-on into problematic separation of powers conflicts: 
It is the strong belief of the committee that Federal suppon is necessary to 
assist in the creation of community mental health services, but such Federal 
suppon should be so tailored as not to result in the Federal Government assum­
ing the traditional responsibility of the States, localities and the medical profes­
sion for the care and treatment of the mentally ill. The committee believes that 
title II [of CMHCA) accomplishes this objective. 
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IV. THE PROMISE IMPROVED: THE TRANSITIONAL PHASE 
The national trend towards deinstitutionalization spirited by 
President Kennedy's attack on mental disabilities met with great suc­
cess in its early years. In 1965, the 89th Congress voted to extend 
title II of the 1963 legislation,39 in order to alleviate "the immediate 
financial problems which are acute and critical to the success of im­
proving the treatment of the mentally ill through establishing com­
munity mental health centers."40 Stating that its intention was not 
that the federal government assume the traditional responsibilities of 
the states in this field, the committee designated the government's 
proper role in this transitional period as one of granting financial 
assistance. Thus, allocations for federally funded programs were 
made on a declining basis.41 
Minor amendments extending CMHCA were enacted during 
sessions of the 89th and 90th Congresses,42 and in 1970, a new 
H.R. REP. No. 694, supra note 32, at 13, reprinted in 1963 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
1066. 
39. See Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers 
Construction Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-105, 79 Stat. 427. 
40. S. REP. No. 366, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinled in 1965 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 2401, 2403. 
41. When passed, the scale provided seventy-five percent of the cost of professional 
and technical personnel for fifteen months; sixty percent for the next twelve months; 
forty-five percent for the next twelve months; and thirty percent for the final twelve 
months. Id 
42. See Mental Health Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-31, 81 Stat. 79; Voca­
tional Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-333, 79 Stat. 1282. In 
considering the former enactment, the Senate noted that despite progress made in the 
area, "we are a long way from the goals that were identified when the legislation for 
community mental health centers was proposed m1963. Our goal was to reduce the 
resident population in public mental hospitals to 250,000 by 1973. Our present census is 
480,000." S. REP. No. 294. 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprillled in 1967 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 1252, 1254. Furthermore, Congress recognized its failure to attain its goals for 
complete coverage: only two hundred eighty-six out of the intended two thousand com­
munity centers received funding in the 1967 fiscal year. Congress' intent to give a new 
impetus to deinstitutionalization was evidenced in its delineation of "comprehensive 
coverage." Comprehensive coverage includes such "essential elements" as inpatient and 
outpatient services, emergency and partial hospitalization services, and education and 
consulting services. "Additional elements" include diagnostic. rehabilitative. pre care 
and after care services, training programs. and research and evaluation programs. Id at 
3-6, reprinled in 1967 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1254-56. To attain these ends. 
Congress authorized for appropriation, $238 million over a three year period. Mental 
Health Amendments of 1967. Pub. L. No. 90-31. §§ 2-3, 81 Stat. 79; S. REP. No. 294. 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinled in 1967 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1258 (chart). 
The 90th Congress also passed the Mental Retardation Amendments of 1967, Pub. 
L. No. 90-170, 81 Stat. 527. similarly authorizing the establishment of more community 
facilities specifically for persons with retardation. A total of $80 million was appropri­
ated for this end. S. REP. No. 725, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprillled in 1967 U.S. CODE 
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framework for mental health services was imposed on the existing 
scheme by the 9lst Congress. The Developmental Disabilities Serv­
ice and Facilities Construction Amendments of 197043 were a three­
year extension of the existing grant program to promote the con­
struction and staffing of facilities for persons with retardation. The 
amendments expanded the scope of the program's coverage to in­
clude individuals suffering from other neurological handicapping 
conditions requiring similar care.44 A new label, "developmental 
disabilities,"45 was adopted explicitly to provide needed services to a 
population discovered to have "fallen between the cracks" of avail-
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2061, 2067 (chart). Additionally, these amendments established a 
grant program to train professionals to staff community residential programs, furthering 
the congressional goal of de institutionalization. Senators lavits and Prouty stated: 
This provision is, in effect, an investment in rehabilitation. Mentally re­
tarded children can be educated to be useful citizens, in many cases self-sup­
porting, and in most instances to be free of the need for expensive institutional 
care.... 
[Our aid towards this rehabilitation can mean) the difference between be­
ing a whole human being and being an impersonal statistic in an institution. 
Id at 17, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2071. 
43. Pub. L. No. 91-517, 84 Stat. 1316. 
44. In addition to specifying cerebral palsy and epilepsy as "developmental disa­
bilities," see infra note 45, Congress delegated to the Secretary of the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare the duty of evaluating and determining which additional 
disabilities qualify for assistance of federally funded programs. Pub. L. No. 91-517, 
§ 139, 84 Stat. 1324. 
45. The definition of "developmental disabilities" is subject to fluctuation upon 
approval of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) (for­
merly the Department of Health, Education and Welfare). As currently defined, the 
term includes any disability of a person which: 
(i) [i)s attributable to mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or autism; 
(ii) is attributable to any other condition of a person found to be closely related 
to mental retardation because such condition results in similar impairment of 
general intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior to that of mentally re­
tarded persons or requires treatment and services similar to those required for 
such persons; or (iii) is attributable to dyslexia resulting from a disability de­
scribed in paragraph (a)(i) or (ii) ...; (iv) originates before such person attains 
age eighteen; (v) has continued or can be expected to continue indefinitely; and 
(vi) constitutes a substantial handicap to such person's ability to function nor­
mally in society. 
45 C.F.R. § 1385.2(a)(6) (1982). This may be compared to the 1978 amended statutory 
definition which includes: 
any severe, chronic disability of a person which- (A) is attributable to a 
mental or physical impairment or combination of mental and physical 
impairments; 
(8) is manifested before the person attains age twenty-two; 
(C) is likely to continue indefinitely; 
(0) results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the 
following areas of major life activity: (i) self-care. (ii) receptive and ex­
pressive language, (iii) learning, (iv) mobility, (v) self-direction, 
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able federally funded programs.46 
V. 	 THE BILL OF RIGHTS ACT: LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND PLAIN 
LANGUAGE 
Against this legislative backdrop emerged the Developmentally 
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (Bill of Rights Act).47 As 
its name indicates, the Bill of Rights Act was intended to provide a 
new dimension to national efforts aiding persons with disabilities.48 
The following discussion explores the parameters of that dimension. 
A. The Statute's Plain Language 
In its present form, the Bill of Rights Act is divided into three 
main sections. Title I calls for the "Extension and Revision of the· 
Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction 
Act" and basically outlines a federal-state cooperative funding. 
scheme to serve persons with developmental disabilities. Part A of 
title I extends existing grant authorities, while part B revised federal 
assistance for university-affiliated facilities. Notable for our pur­
poses are sections 10549 and 11O(b),50 which state clear congressional 
(vi) capacity for independent living, and (vii) economic self-sufficiency; 
and 
(E) reliects the person's need for a combination and sequence of special, 
interdiSciplinary, or generic care, treatment, or other services which are of 
lifelong or extended duration and are individually planned and 
coordinated. 
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments 
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 9S-602, § S03(b)(I), 92 Stat. 3004-0S (codified at 42 U.S.c. 
§ 6001(7)(A)-(E) (Supp. IV 1980». 
46. See H.R. REP. No. 1277, 91st Cong., 2ndSess. 13, reprinled in 1970 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 4714, 4718. 
47. Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (197S) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c.A. 
§§ 6000-6081 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978-81». 
48. Although the Supreme Court found that the Bill of Rights Act represented "a 
mere federal-state funding statute," Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 
451 U.S. at 18, intended to "encourage, rather than mandate, the provision of better 
services to the developmentally disabled," id at 20 we believe that our careful inspection 
of its legislative history shows that it is more than a mere funding statute. The legislative 
process, including three years of hearings, extensive debate, and study of institutions and 
their alternatives, demonstrates the studied intention with which Congress abandoned a 
purely encouragement-funding strategy and adopted an enforcement-rights solution. 
49. Pub. L. No. 94-103, sec. lOS, §§ 121-127, 89 Stat. 486-88 (197S) (codified as 
amended at scattered sections of 42 U.S.c.). Section lOS provided in part that "[tJhe 
Secretary shall give special consideration to applications for grants . . . for programs 
which demonstrate an ability and commitment to provide within a community rather 
than in an institution services for persons with developmental disabilities." Id. sec. lOS, 
§ 122(b), 89 Stat. 487 (I97S) (current version at 42 U.S.c. § 6032 (Supp. IV 1980». 
SO. Id, sec. llO(b), § 132(a)(4), 89 Stat. 490 (l97S), repealed by Rehabilitation. 
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intent to assist states in the deinsitutionalization process. Likewise, 
section 111(a)51 merits our attention; it requires that state plans be 
submitted for approval to the Secretary of the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS). These plans are required to assure 
"that the human rights of all persons with developmental disabilities 
(especially those without familial protection) who are receiving treat­
ment, services or habilitation under programs assisted under this 
chapter will be protected ...."52 Further, evidence that Congress 
intended these rights to be realized is contained in the same provi­
sion requiring the State Planning Council to "provide for a design 
for implementation which shall include details on the methodology 
of implem~ntation of the State Plan."53 
Title II provides for the "Establishment and Protection of the 
Rights of Persons with Developmental Disabilities"54 and contains 
the so-called "Bill of Rights," which serves as the focal point of the 
discussion below. Title III, entitled "Miscellaneous,"55 provides that 
the Secretary is to determine which disabilities shall be covered by 
the Act within six months of its enactment. 
Significant amendments to the Act were made in 1978 and are 
discussed where relevant below. 56 The only other noteworthy legis­
lative change in the statute occurred at the onset of the Reagan Ad­
ministration's budget cutting efforts: appropriations for the Act were 
slashed by more than one-half in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 
198 J.S7 
Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-602, § 510(b)(I), 92 Stat. 3010. Section 1l0(b) provided in pan that: 
Of the amount allotted to any State under paragraph (I) for fiscal year 
1976, not less than 10 per centum of that allotment shall be used by such State, 
in accordance with the plan submitted, . . . for the purpose of assisting it in 
developing and implementing plans designed to eliminate inappropriate. place­
ment in institutions of persons with developmental disabilities; and of the 
amount allotted to any State under paragraph (I) for each succeeding fiscal 
year, not less than 30 per centum of that allotment shall be used by such State 
for such purpose. 
Id 
51. Id, sec. 111(a), § 134, 89 Stat. 490 (1975) (codified as amended at scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
52. Id, sec. 1 I I (a)(9), § 134(b), 89 Stat. 491 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6063(b)(5)(C) (Supp. IV 1980». 
53. Id (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 6063 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980». 
54. Id, sees. 201-204, §§ 111-113,89 Stat. 502-05 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C.A. §§ 6010-6012 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978-81». 
55. Id, sees. 301-303, 89 Stat. 505-07 (1975). 
56. See Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities 
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955. 
57. Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 911, 913, 95 Stat. 357, 563-64. It is panicularly imponant 
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B. Legislative Intent: Explicit and Obviously Implied 
/ conceive a Bill of Rights should be a plain positive dec/aration of 
the rights themselves. . . it should retain such natural rights as are 
either consistent with, or absolutely necessary toward our happiness 
in a state ofcivil government. 58 
The practice of enumerating cognizable and enforceable rights 
in charter form is a well established tradition in American history. 
By 1784, seven of the thirteen original states had adopted declara­
tions of discrete rights and four others had incorporated specified 
individual rights into their constitutions. 59 For some colonial legis­
. lators, ratification of the federal constitution was conditioned upon 
the new states' agreement to adopt a federal Bill of Rights. This was 
successfully accomplished during the first session of Congress on 
September 26, 1789.60 
In light of America's early heritage and struggle for indepen­
dence, it is highly improbable that the 94th Congress passed into law 
a "Bill of Rights for the Developmentally Disabled" without full ap­
preciation of the import of its chosen words. Senator 1acob 1a vits of 
New York originally introduced S. 45861 as a Bill of Rights for per­
sons with retardation in response to the horrors uncovered at Wil­
10wbrook,62 an institution located in his home state. Unable to 
muster enough support through his own efforts, lavits agreed to in­
corporate S. 458 into S. 3378,63 a measure proposed "to provide 
assistance for the Developmentally Disabled, establish a bill of rights 
for the Developmentally Disabled, and for other purposes."64 En-
in a period of economic recession that the rights recognized by Congress in the Bill of 
Rights Act receive full judicial support. By taking the bite out of this federal statute (by 
relegating state compliance therewith from mandatory to volitional, 451 U.S. at 22), the 
Supreme Court in Pennhurst abandoned the disabled to cost-conscious state legislatures 
which are rarely influenced by politically powerless disabled persons. 
58. Paine, Thomas Paine on a Bill ofRights, in I THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY 315 (B. Schwanz ed. 1971). 
59. J. GOEBEL, supra note 14,·at 101 n.15. 
60. See supra note 15. 
61. 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
62. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 
752, 755-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), enforced sub nom., New York State Ass'n for Retarded 
Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), enforced 409 F. Supp. 606 
(E.D.N.Y. 1976); G. RIVERA, WILLOWBROOK: A REPORT ON How IT Is AND WHY IT 
DOESN'T HAVE TO BE THAT WAY (1972). 
63. 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONGo REC. 33,097 (1974). 
64. Id. at 33,151. As incorporated into title II of S. 3378, the purpose of the "Bill 
of Rights for the Mentally Retarded and Other Individuals with Developmental Disabili­
ties" was "to establish standards which assure human care, treatment, habilitation. and 
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acted to correct inequities discovered by the General Accounting Of­
fice's study of mental health services, this Bill passed the Senate 
without a dissenting vote on October I, 1974;65 the 93rd Congress, 
however, adjourned shortly thereafter, before S. 3378 could go into 
conference. 
Supporters of S. 3378 were determined to fulfill the nation's 
commitment to its mentally disabled population and introduced S. 
3378 as a clean bill, S. 462,66 at the very next session. Bearing the 
same title as its predecessor, S. 462 was similarly introduced by Sen­
ator Jennings Randolph with an intent to "amend the Developmen­
tal Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act to revise and 
extend the program authorized by that Act."67 Several "technical or 
minor" differences were noted between the two bills;68 however, 
their basic thrust was identical: to provide high quality services to 
and promote maximum development of the developmentally 
disabled. 
Title II of S. 462, containing the "Bill of Rights for Mentally 
Retarded and Other Persons with Developmental Disabilities," was 
considered the "most important aspect of the bill."69 This section of 
title II sought to establish residential and community facilities for 
the developmentally disabled, and to develop alternative procedural 
and performance criteria for use by facilities to comply with its stan­
protection of the mentally retarded and other individuals with development disabilities 
in residential facilities and minimize inappropriate admissions to such residential facili­
ties." Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill ofRights Act, 1974: Hearing Before 
Subcomm. on the Handicapped o/the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 3378, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1974). 
Minutely detailed regulations for accomplishing this goal were set out. In voicing 
his approval of the scheme, Mr. Stephen Kurzman, Assistant Secretary for Legislature, 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare stated that, "[i)t is the policy of HEW to 
encourage deinstitutionalization where such a program is consistent with the capacities of 
the individuals concerned and where the home community can provide alternate serv­
ices. Id at 277. 
65. 120 CONGo REC. 33,151 (1974). 
66. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 121 CONGo REC. 1,507 (1975). 
67. Id at 16,470. 
68. Senator Randolph noted that S. 462 called for the clarification of committee's 
intent that only severe specific learning disabilities are to be included in the definition of 
developmentally disabled; deletion of the provision calling for an Office of Developmen­
tal Disabilities; deletion of requirement of federal approval of construction and renova­
tion projects; addition of protections for employees "who either lose their jobs or are 
transferred because of the deinstitutionalization process. This in no way changes the 
committee's commitment to deinstitutionalization whenever appropriate for the individ­
ual"; revamping and clarification of the section on evaluation procedures; and technical 
changes and consolidation of duplicative language. Id at 16,515. 
69. Id at 16,516 (1975) (statement of Sen. Stafford). 
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dards. The clear intent was "to assist in the protection of the rights 
guaranteed under our Constitution for those individuals that will re­
quire institutionalization or the need for the use of community facili­
ties and programs."70 
Further evidence that title II of S. 462 was intended by its sup­
porters to create enforceable rights for the developmentally disabled 
is found in Senator Williams' discussion of the bill on the floor. Re­
calling the atrocities of Willowbrook in New York, Partlow in.Ala­
barna, and Rosewood in Maryland,71 Senator Williams reminded his 
colleagues of the universality of institutional abuse and the need to 
bring it to an end: "While much can be said about the lack of avail­
able funds to improve conditions at these institutions, at some point 
this country must draw the line. The abuses are too commonplace to 
point at a single institution, or a single abuse and say it is an anom­
aly."72 By specifying explicit minimum standards for both commu­
nity service agencies and residential facilities, S. 462 provided a 
framework by which the constitutional rights of residents and other 
persons with developmental disabilities could be measured and 
enforced. 
;The authority with the greatest insight as to the meaning of title 
II of S. 462 is the author of the original Bill of Rights for the Men­
tally Retarded, Senator Jacob Javits of New York. Debates on the 
issues presented in the Bill of Rights since the 92nd Congress con­
vinced the New York Senator that a comprehensive planning ap­
proach to improve the situation· of persons with developmental 
disabilities would get further mileage than legislation directed solely 
at mental institutions.73 Relying on the mechanism provided in sec­
tion 203 of the Bill of Rights Act, by which a state must assure HHS 
that its federally funded residential and community facilities comply 
with title II's alternative set of standards,74 Senator Javits believed 
that the primary emphasis for federally funded programs would be 
to place those individuals in the least restrictive program and living 
environment commensurate with their capabilities.75 Those state 
plans failing to measure up to title II's standards would simply re­
70. Id. 
71. Id. (statement of Sen. Williams). 
72. Id. at 16.516-17. 
73. Id. at 16.518 (statement of Sen. Javits). 
74. Pub. L. No. 94- \03. § 203. 89 Stat. 504 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C.A. § 6012 (West Supp. 1978-81». 
75. 121 CONGo REC. at 16.518 (statement of Sen. Javits). 
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main ineligible for federal funding. 76 Clearly, in passmg S. 462, 
Congress embraced the principles of deinstitutionalization and 
normaliza tion. 77 
There can be no doubt that the text of the final version of the 
Bill of Rights Act, as ratified by both Houses of Congress and consis­
tent with legislative intent, recognizes substantive rights of America's 
citizens with mental disabilities and creates procedural safeguards to 
guarantee these rights. In his discussion of the conference report, 
Senator Stafford stated: "Title II provides for procedural guarantees 
of the rights of the developmentally disabled in programs supported 
by the Federal Government. It also strengthens the administrative 
ability of the Department of HEW to protect the constitutionally 
guaranteed rights of institutionalized individuals. "78 Furthermore, 
the "rights" were retained in the conference committee's compro­
mise "in recognition by the conferees that the developmentally dis­
abled, particularly those who have the misfortune to require 
institutionalization, have a right to receive appropriate treatment for 
the condition for which they are institutionalized, and that this right 
should be protected and assured by the Congress and the courtS."79 
It is noteworthy that conferees of both Houses of Congress accepted 
the Bill of Rights Act despite express official disapproval by the De­
partment of HEW. In a letter dated February 19, 1975, Secretary of 
HEW, Casper Weinberger, wrote: "We do not believe that the stan­
dards set forth in Title II are achievable at the present time, nor are 
they the best means of improving the quality of care provided to 
persons in these facilities."80 As a substitute for S. 462, Secretary 
76. The constitutionality of requiring state compliance with federal standard; in 
return for highly competitive federal funds is well settled. Oklahoma v. United Stal~" 
Civil Servo Comm'n. 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 
585-93 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,68-78 (1935). "It is a contradiction in 
terms to say that there is power to spend for the national welfare, while rejecting any 
power to impose conditions reasonably adapted to the attainment of the end which alone 
would justify the expenditure." Id at 85 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
77. "Normalization" is a concept that encompasses the techniques and goals of 
habilitation. It encompasses the creation of an environment designed to increase com­
plexity of behavior and to foster qualities defined as normative by the world in which we 
live. See general(J! Wolfensberger, The Dtfinition of Normalization: UpdOie. Problems. 
Disagreemenls. and Misunderstanding, in NORMALIZATION, SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND 
COMMUNITI' SERVICES 71-115, (R. Flynn & K. Nitsch eds. 1980) (background discussion 
of the concept of "normalization" and the controversies surrounding its definition). 
78. 121 CONGo REC. 29,819 (1975) (statement of Sen. Stafford). 
79. Id (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 42. reprimed in 
1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 943. 961. 
80. H.R. REP. No. 58. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 23. reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 919. 941 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 58). 
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Weinberger submitted a proposal that would omit any correspond­
ing provision to title II and one that was approved by the Office of 
Management and Budget as in accordance with the program of Pres­
ident Nixon.81 
Despite official administrative objection and over the money­
minded protestations of Representatives Devine and Collins,82 Con­
gress deliberately enacted the Bill of Rights as it emerged from con­
ference. s3 For the first time under federal law, section 6010 
establishes a right of the developmentally disabled to appropriate 
treatment, services, and habilitation designed to maximize develop­
mental potential of the person and provided in a setting that is least 
restrictive of personal liberty.s4 Furthermore, the section explicitly 
imposes on the federal government and the states an obligation to 
assure that public funds be withheld from institutions or residential 
programs serving the disabled that do not provide adequate treat­
ment services or habilitation, or meet an alternate scheme com­
prised of six standards.85 Additional safeguards provided by section 
6011 are individual habilitation plans for each person served in pro­
grams funded under the Act as well as a requirement of continuous 
review and evaluation of programs by the Secretary of HHS.R6 
In 1978, three significant amendments were made to the Bill of 
Rights Act. First, the definition of "developmental disabilities" was 
amended to delete specific categories of mental illness and to substi­
tute a defuiition including mental or physical impairments resulting 
in particular disabilities.87 Secondly, the National Advisory Board 
was abolished.88 Finally, the language of section 6010 was amended 
to clarify that the rights of the developmentally disabled established 
in the Act are "in addition to any constitutional or other rights other­
81. Id at 21-23. reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 939-41. 
82. Id at 43. reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 942-43. 
83. 121 CONGo REC. 29,309 (1975) (House); id at 29.317 (Senate). The Bill of 
Rights as enacted by Congress is codified at 42 U.S.c. § 6010 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
84. 42 U.S.c. §6010(1)-(2) (1976); see also 121 CONGo REC. 29.821 (statement of 
Sen. Williams). 
85. 42 U.S.c. § 6010(3) (1976); see also 121 CONGo REC. 29.820 (statement of Sen. 
Javits). 
86. 42 U.S.c. § 6011 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
87. Rehabilitation. Comprehensive Services. and Developmental Disabilities 
Amendments of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-602. § 503(b)( I). 92 Stat. 3004-05 (codified at 42 
U.S.c. § 6001(7)(A)-(E) (Supp. IV 1980)); see supra note 29. 
88. 42 U.S.c. § 6007 (1976). repealed by Rehabilitation. Comprehensive Services. 
and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-602. § 504(a). 92 
Stat. 3006. 
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wise afforded to all persons."89 
VI. THE PROMISE OF PENNHURST 
It was in the context of a Pennsylvania case, Halderman v. Pen­
nhursl Slate School & Hospilal,90 that the Supreme Court of the 
United States undertook its review of the Bill of Rights Act. This' 
section discusses the background of the case. 
A. Pennhurst on Trial 
Headline-hungry journalists did not burst open the doors of 
Pennhurst; nor was it purely parental concern prompting this com­
plex, still lingering litigation. Rather, the case was initiated by the 
institution's administration, when Pennhurst's assistant superinten­
dent prompted Winifred Halderman, on behalf of her daughter, 
Terri Lee Halderman, to call David Ferleger, an attorney specializ­
ing in disability law. Subsequently, suit was filed in an effort to end 
what had become a living hell for far too many Pennsylvanians. 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital was established in 1908 as 
the Eastern Pennsylvania School for the Feeble-Minded and Epilep­
tic.91 Its purpose was to care for and train residents with retarda­
tions and enable them to return to society as functioning human 
beings.92 As was common among other large institutions at the time, 
however, this objective received short shrift. Instead, Pennhurst con­
tinually visited inexorable physical and psychological damage on 
those it was established to assist. The institution increased the help­
lessness of its residents who, by virtue of their handicap, were least 
89. Rehabilitation. Comprehensive Services. and Developmental Disabilities 
Amendments of 1978. Pub. L No. 95-602. § 507, 92 Stat. 3007 (codified at 42 U.S.c. 
§ 6010 (Supp. IV 1980». The text of section 6010 is reproduced in Appendix A. 
90. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aJ/d, 612 F.2d 84 (3rd Cir. 1979), rev'd and 
remanded, 451 U.S. I (1981), on remand. 673 F.2d 645 (3d Cir.), urt. granted, 102 S. Ct. 
2956 (1982). Implementation matters at 545 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (Special 
Master phased out); 542 F. Supp. 619 (£.0. Pa. 1982) (amendment issued sua sponte); 
536 F. Supp. 522 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (motion to amend granted); 533 F. Supp. 668 (£.0. Pa. 
1982) (motion for stay denied); Id. at 661 (stay denied and report adopted); Id. at 649 
(attorney's fees awarded); fd. at 641 (motion to purge contempt granted); 526 F. Supp. 
428 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (order for Special Master to continue to monitor compliance): fd. at 
423 (order for fines to be used to pay Special Master costs); Id. at 414 (contempt fine 
denied, attorney's fees awarded); 533 F. Supp. 631 (£.0. Pa. 1981) (order aff'd): 526 F. 
Supp.409 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (stay denied); 451 F. Supp. 233 (£.0. Pa. 1978) (stay denied). 
91. 1907 Pa. Laws 44-45 (Act 42); see also Halderman v. Pennhurst State School 
and Hosp .. 446 F. Supp. at 1302. 
92. 1907 Pa. Laws 44-45 (Act 42). 
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able to resist and most likely to suffer from an inflexible system.93 
Through endless years of overcrowding, inadequate funding, 
understaffing, chronic resident abuse and neglect, Pennhurst became 
what United States District Judge Raymond J. Broderick described 
as "a monumental example of unconstitutionality with respect to the 
habilitation of the retarded."94 Over thirty-two trial days, the court 
listened to testimony of eighty witnesses, including thirteen experts 
in the field of retardation, nine parents, three former residents, 
thirty-nine employees, and two Pennsylvania officials. All parties to 
the litigation agreed that Pennhurst, as an institution, constituted an 
inappropriate and inadequate method to achieve habilitation of the 
retarded.95 
The defendants in Pennhursl hired experts to assist them in pre­
paring for trial. After a three months study, yielding a 350 page re­
port with a thousand page appendix, even they concluded that the 
institution was beyond remedy: 
We came to the conclusion that it could not, that there is no way 
that Pennhurst could be made into an adequate facility. It is sim­
ply too far beyond repair and there are just literally hundreds of 
reasons why this is the case, not the least of which is the fact that 
Pennhurst as the whole structure, the whole way of operating out 
there is simply too far gone.96 . 
Based upon such testimony and findings, the trial court ruled that 
Pennhurst violated plaintiffs' constitutional right to adequate habili­
tation, and federal and state statutory rights to minimally adequate 
and nondiscriminatory habilitation.97 The court ordered that Penn­
hurst's doors be closed.98 
B. The Promise on Appeal 
In Halderman v. Pennhursl Slale School & Hospilal99 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit substantially affirmed 
the trial court's decision, while modifying its order in significant 
93. See 446 F. Supp. at 1302-11. 
94. Id at 1320. 
95. Id at 1304. 1313. 
96. 1977 Trial Transcript. at 13-131. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and 
Hosp.• 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1975) (on file with author). 
97. 446 F. Supp. at 1314-24. Such findings were predicated on claims of violations 
of the United States Constitution. as well as on federal and state statutory grounds. Id 
98. Id at 1326-29. 
99. 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979). rev'd and remanded. 451 U.S. I (1981). on remand. 
673 F.2d 645 (3d Cir.), cerl. granted. 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982). 
1983) RIGHTS AND DIGNITY 347 

ways.IOO Although the district court predicated its findings of plain­
tiffs' right to habilitation on constitutional as well as federal and 
state statutory grounds, the court of appeals followed the preferred 
legal method of granting relief in the federal court system and 
turned first to the federal statutory issues. Changing only the statu­
tory grounds upon which the trial court based plaintiffs' right to min­
imally adequate habilitation, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1978,101 the court held that the same right exists pursuant to section 
6010. 102 After an exhaustive review of the Bill of Rights Act's legis­
lative history, the court concluded that the Act expressly provides the 
developmentally disabled with a right to habilitation; indeed, the 
court maintained that Congress could not have been any more pre­
cise in conferring such a right.103 
Next, the Third Circuit held that "retarded persons have a pri­
vate right of action under the ACt."I04 In agreement with the court 
in Naughton v. Bevilacqua,105 the Third Circuit detected a "dichot­
omy" 106 in the Bill of Rights section which suggests that denial of 
funds is not the only enforcement mechanism for the statutory rights 
declared therein.107 The rights included in the Conference Report 
were retained "in recognition by the conferees that the developmen­
tally disabled, particularly those who have the misfortune to require 
institutionalization, have a right to receive appropriate treatment for 
the conditions for which they are institutionalized, and that this right 
should be protected and assured by the Congress and the courts." 108 
100. Although the Third Circuit ruled that people living at Pennhurst are entitled 
to minimally adequate care in the least restrictive environment, Id at 107, it further 
ruled that Pennhurst need not be ordered closed. Id at 113. The court found that each 
Pennhurst resident required an individualized determination of the least restrictive living 
alternative most suited to the needs of the individual. with a presumption in favor of 
community living arrangements. Id at 114. 
101. 29 U.S.c. § 794 (Supp. V 1981). 
102. 42 U.S.c. § 6010 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
103. 612 F.2d at 96'­
104. Id at 97. 
105. 458 F. Supp. 610 (D.R.I. 1978) (injunctive relief and damages granted to re­
tarded child and to the child's father for injuries sustained by the child as a result of 
drugs administered in a Rhode Island institution). 
106. 612 F .2d at 97. Section 60 lOis divided into two parts: "the first 'declares the 
right to appropriate treatment;' the second 'provides that federal funds are available only 
to programs that meet certain basic minimum standards and offer "appropriate" treat­
ment.''' Id (quoting 458 F. Supp. at 616). 
107. Id 
108. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 473. 94th Cong .. 1st Sess. 42, reprinted in 1975 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 943. 961. 
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Furthermore, the court noted that pursuant to section 6012(a),I09 
participating states are required "to establish an independent agency 
to protect and. . . to pursue legal, administrative and other appro­
priate remedies to insure the protection of the rights of such persons 
who are receiving treatment, services or habilitation within the 
State." I \0 The creation of an agency to "protect rights" presumes the 
existence of rights to protect. 
Adhering to the standard for implying a private cause of action, 
as articulated in Corl v. Ash,lll the Third Circuit found that: 
(1) Pennhurst residents as individuals with retardation were un­
doubtedly the beneficiaries of the Act; (2) legislative intent indicates 
congressional desire that the Act be enforceable in the courts; (3) a 
private right of action in this case would further the Act by enabling 
improvements in the delivery of services to persons with develop­
mental disabilities without forcing the federal government to resort 
to the drastic remedy of a cut-off of funds; and (4) Congressional 
recognition of a right to habilitation in section 6010 does not displace 
traditional state concerns, such as providing for the health and well­
being of the citizenry or various police powers. 112 
The final conclusion gleaned by the court of appeals from the 
legislative history of the Bill of Rights Act is that the rights con­
tained in section 60 I0 were enacted by Congress pursuant to both its 
spending power l13 and paragraph five of the fourteenth amend­
109. 42 U.S.c. § 6012(a) (Supp. IV 1980). 
110. 612 F.2d at 97 (quoting 42 U.S.c. § 6012(a) (Supp. IV 1980». The Naughton 
court observed that the "enforcement of individual rights, however, cannot be achieved 
solely by withholding federal funds; not only is the Secretary incapable of investigating 
every violation, but the Secretary may quite properly be unwilling to withhold funds for 
a single violation. Thus, the advocacy agency and a private right of action are crucial to 
protect the rights secured by the Act." 458 F. Supp. at 616. 
Ill. 422 U.S. 66 (1.975). The Con Court listed four factors considered relevant in 
implying a private right of action: (I) whether plaintiffs are especial beneficiaries of the 
statute; (2) whether there exists positive indication of legislative intent to create a private 
remedy; (3) whether a private remedy would further the policies of the statute; and 
(4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to the state. 422 U.S. at 78. 
See a/so Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (implying a private right 
of action under title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.c. § 1681 (1976». 
112. 612 F.2d at 97-99. It is noteworthy, considering the Cort analysis, that no 
negative intent of Congress is indicated in the Bill of Rights Act's legislative history. The 
Supreme Court held in Con that in situations where "it is clear that federal law has 
granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to creole 
a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would 
be controlling." 422 U.S. at 82 (emphasis in original). 
113. 612 F.2d at 98-99. In reference to section 6063(b)(20)(B) (1976), which was 
repealed in 1978, the court noted that "Congress thus invoked its spending clause powers 
to condition the grant of federal monies on the provision by the states of adequate care." 
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ment l14 "In section 6010, Congress has legislated with respect to the 
State intrusion on personal security of the developmentally dis­
abled." liS This right to be free from-and to obtain judicial relief 
for-unjustifiable intrusion of personal security was recognized by 
the Supreme Court in Ingraham v. Wright, 116 and the fourteenth 
amendment makes infringement of such rights enforceable against 
the states: 1I7 "Thus, in providing specific guarantees for a particular 
affected group, Congress' action is consistent with the Supreme 
Court's recognition of the broad underlying right protected against 
impairment by the states through the fourteenth amendment." I 18 
C. A Right is not a Right: The Supreme Court and Pennhurst 
Gertrude Stein would probably have framed the issue before 
the Supreme Court in Pennhurst by stating that "a right is a right is a 
right." Yet at least in the minds of four currently seated Supreme 
Court Justices, 119 the "rights" expressly "established" for protection 
of the developmentally disabled in the Bill of Rights Act by repre­
sentatives in both Houses of Congress are not "rights" deserving 
either judicial aCknowledgement or enforcement. 120 
612 F.2d at 99. Today, section 6063(b)(5)(C) (Supp. IV 1980) replaces the deleted sec­
tion. Pennsylvania accepted funds under the Act and must be held to its obligations 
thereunder. . 
114. 612 F.2d at 98. The court noted that congressional intent to enforce recog­
nized constitutional rights is "amply borne out by the legislative history of the Act." Id 
at 98 n.17. Further. Senator Stafford stated that. "[t)itle II was added to the bill to assist 
in the protection of the rights guaranteed under our Constitution for those individuals 
that will require institutionalization or the need for the use of community facilities and 
programs." 121 CONGo REC. 16,516 (1975) (statement of Sen. Stafford). Finally. Senator 
Javits cited Wyatt V. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971). orders entered, 344 F. 
Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.). 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972). affd in part, rev'd and re­
manded in part sub nom .• Wyatt v. Aderholt. 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). as requiring 
"constitutionally minimum standards for the care and treatment of mentally retarded 
patients." 121 CONGo REC. 16,519 (1975) (statement of Sen. Javits). 
115. 612 F.2d at 98. 
116. 430 U.S. 651. 673 (1977). 
117. Id at 673 n.42. 
118. 612 F.2d at 98. A private cause of action is more readily implied where the 
fourteenth amendment is invoked. for under section five of the amendment. Congress 
may establish certain restrictions that might otherwise implicate the prerogatives of the 
states.ld &98n.19. 
119. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in Pennhurst State 
School and Hosp. v. Halderman. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). and was joined by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justices Stewart. Powell. and Stevens. Justice O'Connor had not yet joined 
the Court. 
120. Id at 15-27. Specifically, the Pennhurst majority held that section 6010 does 
not create. for persons with retardation. any substantive right to appropriate treatment in 
the least restrictive environment. Id at 18. Instead. the Court interpreted the Develop­
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The absurd result reached by the majority of the Court in Penn­
hurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman 121 is objectionable for 
two reasons. First, from a social policy standpoint, the opinion seri­
ously jeopardizes major innovations in legislative reform over the 
last two decades. Secondly, the decision severely undercuts the au­
thority of the Congress to declare and protect the rights of United 
States citizens.122 
The Court reveals its overall lack of familiarity with the subject 
matter of this case in its very first footnote. 123 This overly simplistic 
definition of "community living arrangements" leads an ordinarily 
deferential and unsuspecting reader to believe that the only advan­
tages community living arrangements (CLA) offer over institutions is 
that they are less isolated and afford to people with retardation a 
similar life as nonretarded persons. Such an explanation errone­
ously casts respondents' position in a frivolous light.124 Similarly, 
the scope of the term "developmental disability" is inaccurately 
characterized in footnote three. 125 Had the Court examined the Code 
of Federal Regulations in an effort to secure a definition, it would 
have found that the term embraces full coverage of persons with 
retardation. 126 
mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act as only establishing a national pol­
icy. fd. at 31. 
121. 451 U.S. I (1981). 
122. The authors make no mere observation here but challenge Congress to act 
immediately to prevent the Court from defeating the intent of the legislation. We submit 
proposals for amendments to the Bill of Rights Act as Appendix B to this article. 
123. 451 U.S. at 6 n.1. The footnote states that, "'[c)ommunity living arrange­
ments' are smaller, less isolated residences where retarded persons are treated as much as 
possible like nonretarded persons." fd. Note the 'absence of any reference here to the 
habilitation that community living makes possible. Such habilitation is a raison d'etre of 
such government-provided services. 
124. Community living embraces the use of a larger spectrum of services, some of 
which are used as a maller of course by nonretarded persons. A "house-type" residential 
selling is only one of many different possibilities for community care. There are many 
other models, including foster placement, family placement, apartment living and in­
dependent living. Other existing residential possibilities include subsidized relatives' 
homes and supervised apartment clusters. The type of arrangement depends on the 
needs and abilities of the prospective resident. See generally Heal, Sigelman & Suitzky, 
Research on Community Residential Alternativesfor the Mentally Retarded. in R. Flynn & 
K. Nitsch, supra note 46, at 215-58; Ferleger, Anti·lnstitutionalization and the Supreme 
Court, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. (1983) (in press). 
125. 451 U.S. at8 n.3. The footnote states that "[a)s originally enacted in 1975. the 
definition of 'developmentally disabled' included mental retardation. § 6001(7)(A)(i). 
As amended in 1978, however, a mentally retarded individual is considered developmen­
tally disabled only if he satisfies various criteria set forth in the Act." Id. 
126. See supra note 45. The definition of retardation itself requires the onset of 
retardation early in life, before the age of eighteen, as set forth in the regulation. Id.: 
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The Court places great weight on its finding that the Bill of 
Rights Act was not enacted pursuant to section five of the fourteenth 
amendment. Its conclusion that "Congress will not implicitly at­
tempt to impose massive financial obligations on the States," 127 is 
based on the premise that the Court "should not quickly attribute to 
Congress an unstated intent to act. . ." under its fourteenth amend­
ment authority. 128 The Court notes that other statutes upheld as en­
actments under the fourteenth amendment contain explicit 
references to section five. 129 In this case, an attentive reading of the 
Bill of Rights Act in its entirety and its legislative history, as dis­
cussed above, clearly indicates affirmative congressional intent to 
protect the constitutional rights of people with developmental disa­
bilities, especially their liberty interests. Congress did so by requir­
ing all federally funded programs to provide appropriate habilitation 
in the least restrictive environment. 130 The test set forth in Pennhurst 
is, in fact, satisfied by the Bill of Rights Act. 
The Court correctly recognized that Congress may fix the terms 
on which it shall disperse federal money to the States l31 but proceeds 
to misapply a contract analysis to the Act. Insisting that Congress 
speak with a clear voice when imposing "conditions" on state accept­
ance of federal funds, the Court mistakenly perceives this requisite 
clarity as requiring Congress to spell out the word "condition" in the 
MANUAL ON TERMINOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION II (H. 
Grossman ed. 1977). 
127. 451 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added). 
128. Id at 16 (emphasis added). 
129. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (1972 amendments to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (Voting Rights Act of 
1965). 
130. The Congressional direction and interest were clear. "Too often developmen­
tally disabled persons are 'put away' in an institution and forgotten. It is now time to 
provide alternatives to locking persons up in institutions. Treating the developmentally 
disabled with more human dignity can bring additional benefits to themselves, their fam­
ilies and to SOCiety." 121 CONGo REC. 16,522 (1975) (statement of Sen. Schweiker). 
[O)ne very clear basic goal has been enunciated in the legislation reported from 
committee. That is the need to move away from long-term institutionalization 
of individuals with developmental disabilities to the development of commu­
nity-based programs utilizing all community resources related to treatment or 
habilitation of such individuals to provide comprehensive services in the home 
community. 
Id at 16,520 (statement of Sen. Cranston). The basis for the direction and interest was 
equally clear: the inmates' personal constitutional rights. See supra text accompanying 
notes 70, 114. 
131. 451 U.S. at 35 (White, J., dissenting in part). 
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statutory provision: 132 "Indeed, in those instances where Congress 
has intended the States to fund certain entitlements as a condition of 
receiving federal funds, it has proved capable of saying so explic­
itly." 133 To illustrate its point, the Court relies on King v. Smith, 134 
by stating that the "Social Security Act creates a 'federally imposed 
obligation on the States to furnish aid to families with dependent 
children... .' "135 Such reasoning raises an interesting query: How 
does this language, which supported the Court's finding of congres­
sional intent to impose a condition on state receipt of federal funds, 
differ from the plain language of the Bill of Rights Act? The answer 
is that there is no difference whatsoever: "The Federal Government 
and the States both have an obligation to assure that public funds 
are not provided to any institutional or other residential program for 
persons with developmental disabilities that [do not provide certain 
requirements nor meet certain standards contained herein]."136 In 
this Act, Congress not only conditioned receipt of federal funds upon 
the state's compliance with certain specified federal standards, but 
reaffirmed the federal government's own commitment to fulfilling 
the same ends. Thus, the statutory mandates of section 6010(3) 
should have been doubly clear to the Court . 
. The Court also managed to distort the major issue presented in 
Pennhurst. The twisted path down which the Court wandered was 
this: "[W]hether Congress in [section] 6010 imposed an obligation 
on the States to spend state money to fund certain rights as a condi­
tion of receiving federal moneys under the Act or whether it spoke 
merely in precatory terms."137 The mischief worked by this con­
torted framing of the issue misled the Court to believe that uphold­
ing the statute would overburden the states by placing obscure and 
previously unrecognized affirmative obligations on unsuspecting par­
ticipants under the Act. 138 The Act, however, does not pretend to 
132. The plain language of the statute and legislative history both express a clear 
and unambiguous national commitment to deinstitutionalization. Funhermore, the leg­
islative history demonstrates that Congress was very much aware of the expense involved 
in this undenaking. It is of no impon that section 6010 lacks explicitly "conditional" 
language while numerous other provisions contain the same. Hornbook law teaches that 
contractual conditions may be implied. "The fact that Congress spoke in generalized 
terms rather than the language of regulatory minutia cannot make nugatory actions so 
carefully undenaken." ld 
133. ld at 17-18. 
134. 392 U.S. 309 (1968). 
135. 451 U.S. at 18 (quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. at 333). 
136. 42 U.S.C § 6010(3) (1976). 
137. 451 U.S. at 18. 
138. ld at 17-18. 
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create such affirmative obligations; rather, the statute is prohibitory 
in nature, like the other statutes recognized by the Court as enacted 
pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. The unambiguous obliga­
tion imposed by section 6010 on states choosing to accept federal 
funds under the Act is merely this: Participants must not use public 
funds to maintain facilities for persons with developmental disabili­
ties that do not meet standards determined by Congress to best in­
sure the legal and human rights of the beneficiaries as set forth in the 
Act. 
The Court finds "nothing in the Act or its legislative history to 
suggest that Congress intended to require the States to assume the 
high cost of providing [persons with developmental disabilities] with 
'appropriate treatment' in the 'least restrictive environment.' "139 
Contrary to the Court's findings, provisions contained in both the 
general and specific statements of purpose of the Act support a 
broader construction. Listed under "General Provisions" of the Act 
is a congressional declaration of findings and purpose: "[I]t is in the 
national interest to strengthen specific programs. . . that reduce or 
eliminate the need for institutional care . . . to meet the needs of 
persons with developmental disabilities." 140 The very next provision 
further states: 
It is the overall purpose of this chapter to assist States to assure 
that persons with developmental disabilities receive the care, treat­
ment, and other services necessary to enable them to achieve their 
maximum potential through a system which coordinates, 
monitors, plans, and evaluates those services and which ensures 
the protection of the legal and human rights of persons with devel­
opmental disabilities. 141 
Moreover, title II specifies some of the "legal and human rights" to 
be protected under the Act and, as amended in 1978, leaves no doubt 
that the rights contained in section 6010 are "in addition to any con­
139. Id. at 18. The Court is delinquent in its duty to accurately apply the Act to 
the facts. In making this statement, it omits any reference to the Act as a joint federal 
and state cooperative program, and discusses only state obligations imposed thereunder. 
This misconception drastically prejudiced Respondents' case in the eyes of the Court, for 
without a firm commitment of federal funds to contribute to the process of deinstitution­
alization, the States may not be able to alford the transition costs of moving away from 
traditional institutional care. The Court's failure to mention that the federal government 
is prepared to contribute from seventy-five to ninety percent of the cost of programs 
under this Act was a serious oversight. 
140. 42 U.S.c. § 6000(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). 
141. Id. § 6OOO(b)(I) (Supp. IV 1980). 
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stitutional or other rights otherwise afforded to all persons."142 
Thus, the Court's assertion that "[n]othing in either the 'overall' or 
'specific' purposes of the Act reveals an intent ~o require the States to 
fund new, substantive rights" falls fiat. 143 
The Court's selective treatment of the Act's legislative history 
places great emphasis on the fact that the original House version of 
the Act, "contained no bill of rights provision whatsoever." 144 From 
this the Court concludes that the House Committee "merely ap­
plauded the efforts of others to secure rights for the developmentally 
disabled," instead of joining their ranks.14S In context, the para­
graph from which the Court stripped the word "applauded" explains 
that the committee 
is well aware that our disabled and handicapped citizens are often. 
unreasonably and unnecessarily deprived of their rights and rele­
gated to second class status. As such, it applauds this effort on the 
part of the developmental disabilities program to establish, assure, 
and preserve the rights of the disabled including all of those enu­
merated above. 146 
The Court stopped short of carrying out the next logical step in its 
analysis: By compromising H.R. 14215 to include a modified version 
of the Senate's approved "Bill of Rights" provision, S. 462,147 the 
House adopted the Senate's commitment to establish and protect the 
rights of the developmentally disabled. 148 
The Court charges that the argument in favor of recognizing 
constitutional rights and additional federal guarantees of the devel­
opmentally disabled under the Bill of Rights Act is supported only 
by "scattered bits of legislative history."149 This is not the case, as 
142. Id § 6010 (Supp. IV 1980). 
143. 451 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added). Perhaps the Coun's treatment of section 
6010 was influenced by its mistaken notion that Congress was attempting to impose "ab­
solute obligations" on the States. Id at 18. The obligations imposed in section 6010 are 
conditional and not absolute, and are to be jointly assured by federal and state govern­
ments, not by any single state. 
144. 451 U.S. at 20. 
145. Id 
146. H.R. REP. No. 58, supra note 80, at 7, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 925. 
147. See supra notes 67-83 and accompanying text. 
148. The House Committee funher aniculated its conviction that more money 
could be effectively spent on the Act's programs, panicularly "in light of the new require­
ments for an emphasis on deinstitutionalization ... which is it [sic) realized may prove 
expensive." H.R. REP. No. 58, supra note 80, at 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 926 (emphasis added). 
149. 451 U.S. at 20. 
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we believe the discussion above demonstrated. The Court's state­
ment that "[e]ven Senator Javits, the principle proponent of Title II, 
did not read the Act as establishing new substantive rights to enforce 
those guaranteed by the Constitution"150 does not represent his 
views,151 
In 1978, section 6010 was amended to provide "[t]he rights of 
persons with developmental disabilities described in findings made 
in this section are in addition to any constitutional or other rights 
otherwise afforded to all persons."152 The only support the Court 
offers for its tortured construction of these words, which it finds to 
have only "described" rights and not to have created them,153 is the 
fact that the provision is without any legislative history,154 That is 
the extent of the Court's justification and it is a flimsy basis, one 
unsupported by precedent, upon which to cripple a major piece of 
legislation. Indeed, in the absence of any language indicating nega­
tive intent, these words amply support the implication of a private 
right of action under the ordinary rules of statutory construction. 
In summarily rejecting the Solicitor General's contention that 
Congress conditioned the grant of federal money on the States' 
agreement to underwrite the obligations of section 6010 pursuant to 
its spending power,155 the Court overlooked the necessity of viewing 
the Act in its entirety to determine the intended scope of its opera­
tion. The amended Act provides that the State Plan 
must contain or be supported by assurances satisfactory to the 
150. Id at 21. 
151. Senator Javits is on record stating that: 
Congress should reaffirm its belief in equal rights {or all citizens-including the 
developmentally disabled. Congress should provide the leadership to change 
the tragic warehousing of human beings that has been the product of insensitive 
Federal support of facilities providing inhumane care and treatment of the 
mentally retarded. . . . This Bill of Rights represents a reaffirmation of the 
basic human and civil rights of all citizens. It offers the direction to provide a 
valid and realistic framework for improving the overall situation of this coun­
try's mentally retarded and other developmentally disabled individuals. 
121 CONGo REc. 16,519 (1975) (statement of Sen. Javits). Senator Javits believed that the 
adoption of S.462 would mark a major step forward toward the day when people with 
retardation, their families, their friends and all Americans could be proud that one of our 
most ignored minorities is properly protected under the laws of the United States. Id 
152. 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added). . 
153. 451 U.S. at 22 n.16. A standard grammatical diagram of the statute's provi­
sion, see Appendix C, reveals the Court's misplaced emphasis on the word "described" as 
the active verb in the sentence. The word "are" is the proper verb upon which the Court 
should have focused. "Described" is a mere verb phrase of the subject "rights." 
154. 451 U.S. at 23. 
155. Id at 22-23. 
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Secretary that the human rights of all persons with developmental 
disabilities (especially those persons without familial protection) 
who are receiving treatment, services, or habilitation under pro­
grams assisted under this chapter will be protected consistent with 
section 6010 of this title (relating to rights of the developmentally 
disabled)" 56 
A fair reading of this language suggests that the receipt of federal 
funds is impliedly conditioned upon approval by the Secretary of a 
state plan complying with this provision. The Court acknowledges 
that the Secretary has interpreted the 1978 recodification of section 
6063(b)(5)(C) to require a participating state to assure the Depart­
ment that programs funded under the Act are consistent with section 
6010. 157 Yet the Court fails to fathom the possibility that funds may 
legitimately be withheld for noncompliance, based on the lack of ex­
press statutory authority and support for explicit legislative history. 
Again, the Court's decision eschews the logic in the provisions: if 
there is no state provision in compliance with section 6010 and no 
approvable state plan, there may be no allottment of federal 
funds. ISS 
Unimpressive is the fact that Pennsylvania received only 1.6 
million dollars under the Act in 1976, a sum the Court deems "woe­
fully inadequate to meet the enormous financial burden of providing 
'appropriate' treatment in the 'lease restrictive' setting ...."159 This 
observation fails to support the Court's deduction that "Congress 
must have had a limited purpose in enacting section 6010,"160 and 
indicates instead the lack of initiative Pennsylvania chose to exercise 
in seeking federal aid or more wisely utilizing the funds misspent on 
institutions. 161 To merit a larger grant, Pennsylvania must adopt a 
greater commitment to de institutionalization. The Court should 
have noted that the Bill of Rights Act is a cooperative program, one 
imposing a shared responsibility on federal and state governments to 
remedy conditions of abuse and neglect long visited upon the na­
tion's disabled. 
156. 42 U.S.c. § 6063(b)(5)(C) (Supp. IV 1980). 
157. 45 Fed. Reg. 31,006 (1980). 
158. See supra notes 131·38 and accompanying text. 
159. 451 U.S. at 24. 
160. Jd 
161. In 1978, the annual cost of the Pennhurst institution was found to have been 
more than enough to pay for more effective community services for all of its residents. 
446 F. Supp. at 1311·12. As of June, 1982, this situation remained unchanged. 542 F. 
Supp. 619, 628 (1982). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of the United States has frustrated congres­
sional authority to protect the equal rights of the persons with disa­
bilities through legislation explicitly enacted for that purpose. By 
holding that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of 
Rights Act is a mere expression of "congressional preference for cer­
tain kinds of treatment of the developmentally disabled,"162 the 
Court reduced carefully studied, painstakingly evolved legislation to 
a jumble of "politically self-serving but essentially meaningless lan­
guage about what the developmentally disabled deserve at the hands 
of state and federal authorities."163 
Congress has also been delinquent in its duty to pass legislation 
which would effectively overrule Pennhursl. The decision struck a 
damaging blow to two decades of legislative action which has con­
tributed to a broad national effort to end chronic abuse and unneces­
sary institutionalization. If Pennhurst and other anachronistic 
institutions are allowed to stand, America's promise to its "differ­
ently-abled" population will remain woefully unfulfilled. 
162. 451 U.S. at 19. 
163. Id at 32 (Blackmun, J .• concurring). 
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ApPENDIX A 
§ 6010. Congressional Findings Respecting Rights of the 
Developmentally Disabled. 
Congress makes the following findings respecting the rights of per­
sons with developmental disabilities: 
(1) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to 
appropriate treatment, services and habilitation for such 
dis a bilities. 
(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a person 
with developmental disabilities should be designed to maximize 
the developmental potential of the person and should be provided 
in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's personal 
liberty. 
(3) The Federal Government and the States both have an 
obligation to assure that public funds are not provided to any in­
stitutional or other residential program for persons with develop­
mental disabilities that­
(A) does not provide treatment, services, and habilita­
tion which is appropriate to the needs of such persons; or 
(B) does not meet the following minimum standards: 
(i) Provision of a nourishing, well-balanced daily 
diet to the persons with developmental disabilities being served by 
the program. 
(ii) Provision to such persons of appropriate and 
sufficient medical and dental services. 
(iii) Prohibition of the use of physical restraint on 
such persons unless absolutely necessary and prohibition of the 
use of such restraint as a punishment or as a substitute for ahabil­
itation program. 
(iv) Prohibition on the excessive use of chemical 
restraints on such persons and the use of such restraints as punish­
ment or as a substitute for a habilitation program or in quantities 
that interfere with services, treatment, or habilitation of such 
persons. 
(v) Permission for close relatives of such persons 
to visit them at reasonable hours without prior notice. 
(vi) Compliance with adequate fire and safety 
standards as may be promulgated by the Secretary. 
(4) programs for persons with developmental disabilities 
should meet standards which are designed to assure the most 
favorable possible outcome for those served, and­
(A) in the case of residential programs serving persons 
in need of comprehensive health-related, habilitative, or rehabili­
tative services, which are at least equivalent to those standards ap­
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plicable to intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded 
promulgated in regulations of the Secretary on January 17, 1974 
(39 Fed. Reg. pt. II), as appropriate when taking into account the 
size of the institution and the service delivery arrangements of the 
facilities of the programs; 
(B) in the case of other residential programs for per­
sons with developmental disabilities, which assure that care is ap­
propriate to the needs of the persons being served by such 
programs, assure that the persons admitted to facilities of such 
programs are persons whose needs can be met through services 
provided by such facilities, and assure that the facilities under 
such programs provide for the humane care of the residents of the 
facilities, are sanitary, and protect their rights; and 
(C) in the case of nonresidential programs, which as­
sure the care provided by such programs is appropriate to the per­
sons served by the programs. 
The rights of persons with developmental disabilities described in 
findings made in this section are in addition to any constitutional 
or other rights otherwise afforded to all persons. 
42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
APPENDIX B 
A. Proposed Revision of Section 6010 
Receipt of any funds under this Act is conditioned upon the 
state's observance and active protection of the human and legal 
. rights of the developmentally disabled contained herein. Such rights 
shall be enforceable by any beneficiary of a program or service 
through legal or administrative proceedings, or as otherwise 
appropriate. 
B. Alternate Proposed Revision ofSection 6010 
Rights of persons with developmental disabilities are hereby es­
tablished in addition to any constitutional or other rights otherwise 
afforded to all persons and shall be enforceable through legal or ad­
ministrative proceedings or as otherwise appropriate, without exhaus­
tion ofadministrative remedies [new]. 
C. Proposed Revision of Section 6062 
(a)( 1 ) In each fiscal year, the Secretary shall, in accordance 
360 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:327 
with regulations and this paragraph, allot the sums appropriated for 
such year under section 6061 of this title among the States, on the 
basis of­
(A) the population, 
(B) the extent of need for services for persons with develop­
mental disabilities, and 
(C) the financial need, 
of the respective States. Sums allotted to the States under this sec­
tion shall be (1) conditioned upon the State's observance ofthe human 
and legal rights of the developmentally disabled, including but not lim­
lied to those rights spec(fted in section 6010 herein, [new] and (2) used 
in accordance with approved State plans under section 6063 of this 
title for the provision of services for persons with developmental dis­
abilities. Failure to comply wlih requirements (1) and (2) contained 
herein shall provide cause for wlihdrawal of commlited funds and/or 
foifeliure offuture funds [new]. 
D. Proposed Revision of Section 6012 
(a) In order for a State to receive an allotment ... (l) the. 
State must have in effect a system to protect and advocate the rights 
of persons with developmental disabilities, including but notlimlied to 
those rights under section 6010 herein, [new] (2) such system must 
(A) have the authority to pursue legal, administrative and other ap­
propriate remedies to insure the protection of the rights of such per­
sons who are receiving treatment, services, or habilitation within the 
State, (B) not be administered by the State Planning Council, and 
(C) be independent of any agency which provides treatment, serv­
ices, or habilitation to persons with developmental disabilities, and 
(3) the State must submit to the Secretary in a form prescribed by the 
Secretary in regulations (A) a report, not less often than once every 
three years, describing the system and (B) an annual report describ­
ing the activities carried out under the system and any changes made 
in the system during the previous year. 
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